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Abstract 
We used nine waves of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household income and Wealth (1995-
2012) to investigate a possible trade-off between homeownership and individual participation 
in a supplementary pension scheme. Italy lends itself to this type of investigation because the 
Italian public pension system has been heavily reformed in the period, providing in principle 
incentives for participation, and the homeownership rate is very high. The impact of 
homeownership is captured in two ways: by a dummy for being homeowner and by an index 
defined as the share of housing wealth over total wealth. Our results show that indeed, after 
controlling for a vast array of socio-economic characteristics and allowing for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, both measures of homeownership are negatively associated with 
participation in supplementary pension schemes and that such an effect does not disappear 
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1. Introduction 
Compared to other European countries, the Italian supplementary pension system is still 
underdeveloped in terms of membership, returns, and organisation. The latest reports from 
the supervisory board of pension funds, Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione (Covip, 
2008, 2009, and 2010), show a critical situation with low returns and low take up rates. 
Indeed, participation in pension funds has remained low despite generous tax incentives1 and 
despite the strong default option introduced by the 2007 reform.  
With the 2007 reform, workers in the private sector had the option to choose whether to 
maintain their severance payments (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, TFR) with the firm or 
divert them to a pension fund2. Furthermore, the reform introduced a default option for new 
employees, who would be automatically enrolled in an occupational fund and have six 
months to decide whether or not they intend to switch. The default option did not, however, 
produce the expected results, since participation increased only by approximately 10 
percentage points, from 14 to 24 per cent (Rinaldi, 2011).  
Several reasons can explain the low take-up rate: generous public pension benefits, high 
social security contribution rates, a general mistrust towards financial markets, a lack of 
financial education/pension information (Fornero and Monticone, 2011; Rinaldi 2011); the 
relative attractiveness of the TFR as a savings vehicle compared with more conservative 
investment options since the TFR offers a risk-free rate which, albeit low in nominal terms, 
still exceeds inflation (Rinaldi, 2011). Finally, employers, especially in firms with up to 50 
employees, may pressurize workers into leaving their TFR with the firm, since historically it 
                                                 
1 Dlgs. n. 252/2005, law n.296/2007 and Budget law 2007 introduced tax incentives both for employees and for 
firms in favour of the devolution of firms’ occupational funds (TFR) to private pension funds or treasury. The 
incentives for firms, called “compensation measures” are of fiscal and contribution nature: a 6%/4% tax 
deduction of the funds; and a reduction in employers’ pension contributions to the state. Moreover, contributions 
(both from employee and employer) up to €5,164.57 are entirely deductible. The reform also reduced the tax 
rate on income from complementary pension funds to 15% progressively decreasing by 0.30% for each of 
participation in a pension fund in excess of 15. The tax regime is particularly advantageous if compared to the 
23% tax rate of the TFR. 
2 If workers decide to leave the TFR with the firm, then the 2007 reform prescribes a differential treatment 
according to the size of the firm. Firms with 50 workers or fewer can keep the TFR, while smaller firms (>50 
workers) will have to devolve the TFR to the treasury.   
has been a source of cheap financing (Boeri and Zingales, 2007; Rinaldi, 2011). From a 
behavioural perspective, the irreversibility of choosing a pension fund over the TFR may 
have posed yet another barrier by increasing anxiety and procrastination among workers: an 
irreversible choice can be seen as losing an option, and people are willing to pay a price to 
avoid the emotion of loss (Ariely and Shin, 2004). Finally, we should recall the impact of the 
crisis, which on one side tightened liquidity constraints and, on the other, increased risk 
aversion and mistrust towards financial markets (Rinaldi, 2011). 
Our study explores another plausible explanation analysed in a strand of literature that 
developed from the original intuition of Kemeny (1981), namely the possibility of a trade-off 
between pension plan participation and housing investment. Because homeownership is a 
form of asset accumulation (arguably the most important in southern European countries), 
homeowners secure themselves a valuable asset which can be drawn upon to provide 
economic well-being in old age. Housing investment can therefore be seen as an alternative, 
not necessarily the most efficient given its illiquidity, to a private pension. 
The trade-off between homeownership and the generosity of pension systems has been 
explored at the macro level (Fahey, 2003; Dewilde and Raeymaeckers, 2008), but, to the best 
of our knowledge, the present study is the first to analyse this relationship at the individual 
level and with a specific focus on supplementary pension plans.  
We study Italy for two main reasons. First, the Italian public pension system has been 
heavily reformed3, with less generous public pensions for future generations; therefore higher 
participation in supplementary pension schemes may be desirable, from a normative 
viewpoint, as shown by theoretical models of optimal lifetime portfolio choices under 
                                                 
3 Dini 1995 marked the passage from the defined benefits system to the notional defined contributions system; 
Prodi 1997 introduced stricter seniority requirements; Maroni 2004 increased retirement age from 61 to 62; and 
Fornero 2011 extended defined contribution pro rata to all and increased both retirement age and seniority 
requirements. 
specific assumptions (e.g. labour income risk).4 Second, homeownership in Italy is 
widespread, reaching a rate of 73% in 2013 according to Eurostat data5, with housing assets 
representing a substantial share of household portfolios, therefore it is likely to have an 
impact on other portfolio choices.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and provides 
a conceptual framework. Section 3 illustrates the data and some descriptive evidence. The 
methodology used and the results are presented in Section 4, including a sample robustness 
check and the effect of the 2007 reform. Last Section concludes. 
2. Literature Overview  
Many authors investigate the determinants of participation in pension funds in different 
countries and generally find consistent results. Munnell et al. (2000) and Huberman et al. 
(2007) analyse the determinants and contribution rates of participation in Defined 
Contribution (401)k pension plans in the US. Munnell et al. (2000) find a positive impact of 
age, income, wealth and job tenure; Huberman et al. (2007) also find large positive income 
and wealth effects, as well as a positive gender effect, with women 6.5 percentage points 
more likely to participate than men. At a comparative level, Antolin (2008) analyses the 
determinants of participation in supplementary pension schemes for 8 OECD countries and 
finds that coverage is unevenly distributed across individuals, thus advocating the need to 
increase it, at least among the young and the mid-to-low income.  
One of the mostly investigated issues in the recent literature is the role of education, 
whereby low education in general and low financial education in particular are often found to 
have a negative impact: Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2011) in the US, Fornero and Monticone 
(2011) and Rinaldi (2011) in Italy; Coppola and Lamla (2013) in Germany. Conversely, 
Duflo and Saez (2003) find a small positive effect of information when choosing to 
                                                 
4 For a survey of models see Torricelli (2009). For an all-round treatment of the issue see Bertocchi et al. (2010).  
5 Eurostat: Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household and income group (source: SILC) 
participate in employer sponsored tax deferred accounts, and a larger effect of social 
interactions. Cappelletti and Guazzarotti (2013) use Italian data and confirm a lack of 
knowledge of complementary pension schemes even among those who participate in one, to 
the point that many cannot recall their investment strategy or the amount of their annuity. 
Secondly, they find that participation rates are particularly low among those who would 
benefit from it the most, namely younger workers. Unsurprisingly, the authors also find that 
income is the strongest predictor of participation, as individuals who earn more have more 
resources to subscribe to private pension funds.  
Another strand of literature looks at a possible trade-off between pension plans 
participation and homeownership. Kemeny (1981) was the first to stress the link between 
pensions and homeownership, with the implication highlighted by Fahey (2003) that “ if 
home owners regard their housing assets as a quasi pension fund, they will devote less to 
standard pension provision because they have lack the need or incentive to do so rather than 
because they cannot afford to”. Castles (1998) pointed to a possible trade-off between the 
extent of homeownership and the generosity of old-age pensions and shows that, with some 
exceptions, OECD countries have a negative relationship between homeownership levels and 
pension provision levels. Fahey (2003) and Fahey et al. (2004) test the idea that by promoting 
outright ownership, housing policies can reduce poverty in later life. Similarly, Dewilde and 
Raeymaeckers (2008) test if and how the trade-off between pensions provision and housing 
policies influences old-age poverty. 
Although providing empirical evidence mostly in favour of a trade-off, these studies look 
at the issue by focusing on public pension systems and at a macro level only. The present 
study fills the gap by analysing the relationship between pensions and homeownership at the 
individual level and with a specific focus on supplementary pension plans for a country, Italy, 
where homeownership is very high.  
3. Data and descriptive evidence 
Our investigation draws from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), waves 
1995-2012. The SHIW is a biannual survey conducted by the Bank of Italy on a 
representative sample of the Italian population and includes rich and detailed information on 
socio-demographic variables, households’ assets, work histories, and whether or not they 
participate in a supplementary pension scheme. We use a combination of individual and 
household level data; in our estimation sample, we keep only individuals present in at least 
two waves, so as to exploit the panel component, and we restrict our sample to those aged 
between 20 and 60 and who are not yet retired. The final estimation sample consists of 
56,737 observations for 18,322 individuals / 8,234 households. Summary statistics of the 
estimation sample are provided in the appendix. 
We build the dependent variable Participation as a binary variable equal to 1 for 
individuals who participate in a supplementary pension scheme and 0 otherwise. The 
necessary information was gathered combining the following two survey questions: 
1. “In [year] did you or a member of the household pay into a personal retirement 
plan or supplementary pension fund? Bear in mind that personal pensions (pension 
funds or retirement plans) pay the holder an income only when he/she becomes 
eligible for a state pension. Please also consider the transfer of your severance pay 
entitlement to a pension plan.”6  
2. Member (holder of pension plan - for each pension plan if more than one).7 
Table 1 reports the participation rates by educational attainment, marital status and 
employment status. For simplicity, we recoded educational levels into three categories: Low 
                                                 
6 The wording of this question changed slightly in 2008. Before 2008 it read: “In [YEAR] did you or another 
member of your household, individually or with the help of your, his or her employer, pay premiums for a 
private (or supplementary) pension, an annuity or simply to receive a lump sum in the future (e.g. under 
children’s saving plans)?”  
7 Note that because of the wording of the question we had to recode the variable so that each individual was 
assigned the appropriate score. 
if the individual had either no or elementary education, Medium if the individual has lower or 
upper secondary education, and High if the individual had a degree or higher educational 
levels. We also recoded employment status into four broader categories (recall that 
pensioners are excluded from the sample), i.e. Employee, which includes all payroll workers, 
such as production workers, clerical workers, teachers etc.; Self-employed which includes 
members of a profession, individual entrepreneurs, self-employed workers, and owners or 
employees in a family business., as well as workers as on atypical contracts; Unemployed 
which also includes first job seekers and Not employed which includes homemakers, students, 
voluntary workers and individuals living on independent means. Note that, even though 
supplementary pension schemes are aimed mainly at employed individuals, the 
unemployed/not-employed can participate in individual plans, and for this reason we keep 
them in our sample8. However, we carry out some robustness checks excluding 
unemployed/not employed individuals from our estimation sample in the next section.  
A first glance at Table 1 shows the level of heterogeneity in supplementary pension plan 
participation for different categories. First, participation in a supplementary pension scheme 
is more common among men and the more educated, which is in line with previous research. 
The participation rate for highly educated men is 1.9 times higher than for the low educated; 
the participation rate for women is lower at all educational levels, however, higher educated 
women are 3.8 times more likely to participate than the low educated ones, suggesting a 
much stronger effect of education for women than men. Quite interestingly, participation is 
lowest among singles, but this is likely to be due to age effects, which we will control for in 
the multivariate regression. The remarkably low participation rate among unemployed and 
not-employed men and women is also not surprising.  
                                                 
8 http://www.covip.it/wp-content/uploads/guida_introduttiva.pdf 
Table 1: Participation in supplementary pension funds by gender, educational 
attainment, marital status and employment status 
Male Female All 
 % obs % obs % obs 
Education       
Low 7.6% 11,978 3.5% 13,262 5.4% 25,239 
Medium 12.5% 12,546 8.4% 12,572 10.5% 25,118 
High 14.8% 2,924 13.4% 3,456 14.1% 6,379 
Marital Status       
Couple 13.3% 16,749 7.0% 19,574 9.9% 36,323 
Single 5.8% 9,840 5.4% 7,554 5.6% 17,394 
Divorced 12.7% 756 11.5% 1,367 11.9% 2,122 
Widow (er) 18.0% 104 6.0% 795 7.4% 898 
Employment status       
Employee 12.8% 17,174 11.6% 12,472 12.3% 29,646 
Self employed 13.1% 5,029 11.2% 2,264 12.5% 7,293 
Unemployed 1.0% 3,036 1.9% 2,421 1.4% 5,457 
Not employed 1.4% 2,209 2.0% 12,133 1.9% 14,342 
All 10.6% 27,448 6.8% 29,289 8.6% 56,737 
Source: SHIW 1995-2012. Data are weighted using sampling weights. 
 
Some of the heterogeneity apparent form Table 1 may be imputed to income and/or 
wealth. In Table 2 we show how the participation in supplementary pension plans varies with 
income and wealth quartiles. Predictably, participation rates increase with income and wealth, 
as the percentage of participants is more than five times higher in the top income quartile as 
opposed to the first one, while it is roughly 2.7 times higher in the top wealth quartile 
compared to the bottom one. Again, participation appears to be higher for men at every 
income and wealth level. 
Table 2: Participation in supplementary pension funds by gender, income and wealth 
quartile 
Male Female All 
 Income Wealth Income Wealth Income Wealth 
I 3.7% 6.0% 2.1% 4.0% 2.8% 5.0% 
II 8.0% 8.0% 4.8% 4.7% 6.3% 6.3% 
III 11.3% 12.3% 7.5% 7.6% 9.4% 9.8% 
IV 16.6% 16.2% 11.6% 10.8% 14.2% 13.5% 
Source: SHIW 1995-2012. Data are weighted using sampling weights. 
 
Finally, in Table 3 we report participation rates by gender and homeownership status. 
Because housing tenure is mainly a household choice, regardless of who legally owns the 
dwelling, we decided to consider homeownership at the household, not the individual level. 
Participation rates, both for men and for women, are higher among owners rather than 
renters. Because homeowners usually have higher wages and more wealth, the positive 
relationship may be due spurious correlations, therefore we will account for it in the next 
section.  
Table 3: Participation in supplementary pension funds by gender and homeownership  
Male Female All 
 % obs % obs % obs 
Renter 8.0% 8,272 5.4% 8,667 6.6% 16,938 
Owner 11.8% 19,176 7.4% 20,623 9.5% 39,799 
All 10.6% 27,448 6.8% 29,289 8.6% 56,737 
Source: SHIW 1995-2012. Data are weighted using sampling weights. 
 
As per the evolution of participation rates over time, Figure 1 clearly shows the strong 
impact of the 2007 reform, with participation rates nearly doubling, from 7.2% in 2006-2008 
to 13% in 2012. The trend for men and women is roughly the same, except for the biennium 
2006-2008 which sees women’s participation rates increase while men’s decrease.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of participation in supplementary pension schemes over time, by 
gender  
 




4. Econometric Specifications and Results 
Let yit be a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual participates in a supplementary 
pension scheme, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate the probability of participating using the 
following linear probability model: 
 [1] 
Where xit is a vector of regressors including socio-demographic variables, income and 
wealth quintiles, years of contribution in a public pension fund (which can be considered as a 
rough measure of pension wealth and is likely to have an impact on the dependent variable), 
time and regional fixed effects and, information on homeownership; αi is the individual fixed 
effect; and uit the error term.  
Information on homeownership is fundamental for capturing a possible trade-off between 
supplementary pensions and housing, and we define it in two different ways: a binary 
variable, Homeowner, equal to 1 for owners and 0 for renters, and a continuous indicator, 
HW, equal to the ratio of gross housing wealth (only the residential home) over total wealth 
(real and financial). Moreover, we consider separately the presence of a mortgage using a 
dummy (and for this reason we do not consider net wealth).9 
We first assume that idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated with the x’s and with the 
heterogeneity term αi and estimate equation 1 as a linear probability model (LPM) on a 
pooled sample.  
We then exploit the panel nature of our sample to eliminate time invariant individual 
heterogeneity αi. To do so we de-mean our data, i.e. we calculate time averages of equation 
[1] for each individual (between transformation) and subtract them from the main equation. 
The equation can thus be estimated by the fixed-effects (FE) or within estimator. By taking 
out time averages, time invariant individual heterogeneity will disappear (Wooldridge, 2007).  
Because our dependent variable is binary, we also check robustness by estimating an 
unobserved effects probit by maximum likelihood: 
Y 1 X ,	 	 	 2 	
Where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution; we deal with the unobserved 
heterogeneity αi by assuming that it is linear in the means of all the time-varying covariates, 
i.e. ∑  and estimate a Mundlak-Chamberlain Correlated Random 
Effects (CRE) probit10.  
Both linear and non-linear estimation techniques have their limitations and advantages: 
while the LPM within estimator has the advantage of not imposing any restrictions on the 
relationship between αi and xit, its predicted probabilities are not bounded between 0 and 1; 
conversely, in the CRE framework the relationship between αi and xit is restricted in some 
way, but the predicted probabilities are bounded. In both cases, we have to assume serial 
                                                 
9 The same indicator is used in Brunetti et al. (2012) to analyse whether excessive portfolio illiquidity due to 
homeownership is connected to financial fragility of Italian households.  
10 Note that we used the terms “fixed” and “random” effects in the Wooldridge (2007) meaning.  
independence, i.e. no feedback effects. We use both estimation techniques to ensure our 
results are robust to functional form. 
Since we are using a panel, our sample contains several observations on the same 
individuals which are not independent of each other, we thus control for it by clustering 
standard errors at the individual level. 
4.1. Results 
Table 4 and Table 5 show our results for all different econometric specifications. In Table 
4 housing investment is represented by the binary variable Homeowner as previously 
described, while Table 5 considers housing investment as the share of housing wealth over 
total wealth, HW.  
Despite the positive relationship in the descriptive section (Table 3), having accounted for 
socio-economic and demographic features, we find that being a homeowner has a negative 
and highly significant effect. Moreover, when we take into account individual unobserved 
heterogeneity, the coefficient increases in size, from -0.019 to -0.035 in the linear 
specification, and from -0.021 to -0.028 in the nonlinear one. Considering that the average 
participation rate in our sample is 8.4%, we can see a 3.5/2.8 percentage points’ difference as 
a relatively large effect. Because with the fixed-effects/correlated random effects 
specifications we consider the deviation from the means of time-varying covariates, we might 
say that a change from renting to owner occupied housing is associated with a lower 
probability to participate in a pension fund11.   
Similarly, when using the continuous indicator for homeownership, HW, we have a 
negative, highly significant effect as shown in Table 5. 12 Once again, the impact is larger 
                                                 
11 We cannot exclude reverse causality or feedback effects, however the possibility that an individual may 
decide to move to a rented accommodation following the decision to participate in a pension scheme seems 
unlikely. 
12 In cases where both numerator and denominator of the fraction were equal to zero (roughly 1,000 
observations) we assigned a value of 0. 
when we take into account unobserved individual heterogeneity (last two columns) 
suggesting that a simple regression on a pooled sample may underestimate the relationship of 
interest.  
The marginal effects from the CRE probit regressions plotted in Figure 2 show how the 
probability to participate in a supplementary pension scheme declines steadily as the HW 
index increases, from roughly 16% at 0 to roughly 5% at 1. Two are the main explanations 
put forward in the literature on the pension/homeownership trade-off since Kemeny (1981) 
and Castles (1998): the budget constraint motivation and the need for incentives one. 
According to the former, given limited resources and a budget constraint, accumulating 
housing wealth is alternative to accumulating pension wealth. A complementary explanation 
is that homeowners lack needs or incentives for supplementary pensions, since they can take 
advantage of the security and implicit income provided by their real estate.  
Table 4 and 5 also report estimates for the socio-economic control variables. The 
coefficients are very similar in all specifications, even though marital status, educational 
attainment and self-employed lose significance in the fixed effects/correlated random effects 
specifications. One possible explanation is that both marital status and educational attainment 
do not vary much over time in our sample, and are therefore close to being an individual 
fixed effect. Predictably, unemployed and not employed individuals are less likely to 
participate in a pension fund compared with employees; interestingly, the coefficient on self-
employed is negative even though we might expect self-employed individuals to have a lower 
replacement rate and therefore be more likely to participate in a supplementary pension 
scheme. However, it is only significant in the pooled regressions. Despite the negative effect 
of homeownership, having a mortgage is significantly and positively associated with 
participation in a supplementary pension scheme. This result may be explained by the fact 
that households with mortgages are sound both from an economic and from a financial 
viewpoint (due to the strict screening Italian banks apply to mortgage requests) and by the 
greater familiarity mortgage holder have with financial products.    
For what concerns other socio-demographic determinants, we find some effects consistent 
with previous literature and some in contrast; for instance, participation is increasing in age 
(although in a concave fashion) and in income and wealth, as found by Huberman et al. 
(2007), Cappelletti and Guazzarotti (2013). Unlike Huberman et al. (2007) or Coppola and 
Lamla (2013) we find a negative gender effect, already mentioned in the descriptive analysis, 
which may be due the widespread lack of financial education among Italian women (Fornero 
and Monticone, 2011). The number of years of pension contributions13 is positively and 
significantly associated with participation in a supplementary pension scheme. Theoretically, 
we might expect workers with more years of pension contributions to have a lower incentive 
to participate in a private pension fund; however, the same workers might have developed a 
higher sensitivity to the subject of retirement savings, and may therefore be more likely to 
understand the importance of complementary pensions.  
 
                                                 
13Regarding the SHIW variable for pension contributions, we followed Ciani and Fresu (2011) and assumed no 
measurement error.   
Table 4: Participation in supplementary pension schemes and homeownership (dummy) 
LPM Probit(a) FE-LPM CRE probit(a) 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Homeowner -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.035*** -0.028*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared/100 -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.013*** -0.013*** OMITTED -0.008*** 
(0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) 
Single -0.020*** -0.018*** 0.000 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Divorced -0.005 -0.006 0.013 0.005 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Widow(er) 0.006 0.018 0.019 0.012 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Medium Education 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.006 -0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
High Education 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.010 0.003 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.004 0.000 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Head of household 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.008 0.008* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Self-employed -0.007 -0.008* -0.002 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployed -0.034*** -0.061*** -0.020*** -0.026*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Out of workforce -0.023*** -0.046*** -0.013* -0.017*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of contribution 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has a mortgage 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
II income quartile   0.010*** 0.019*** 0.006 0.009*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
III income quartile   0.025*** 0.031*** 0.010* 0.011*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
IV income quartile  0.041*** 0.047*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
II wealth quartile 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
III wealth quartile 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
IV wealth quartile  0.051*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.136***  -0.032  
(0.02)  (0.12)  
Individual Effects NO NO YES YES 
Macroarea YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
# obs 52,218 52,218 52,218 52,218 
# indiv 18,294 18,294 18,294 18,294 
R2/pseudo R2 0.090 0.182 0.043 
F/ Wald χ2/ p-val 73.19 / 0.000 2,659.89 / 0.000 19.02 / 0.000 2,038.10 / 0.000 
F/ Wald test αi=0 / p-val - - 1.88 / 0.000 115.52 / 0.000 
ρ - - 0.580 0.481 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
(a)Coefficients reported refer to average marginal effects 
 Table 5: Participation in supplementary pension schemes and homeownership (index) 
LPM Probit(a) FE-LPM CRE probit(a) 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
HW -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.041*** -0.032*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared / 100 -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.014*** -0.013*** OMITTED -0.008*** 
(0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) 
Single -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.000 -0.003 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Divorced -0.006 -0.007 0.009 0.004 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Widow(er) 0.007 0.020 0.029 0.021 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Medium Education 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.007 -0.002 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
High Education 0.035*** 0.031*** -0.011 0.003 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.003 0.000 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Head of household 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.008 0.008* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Self-employed -0.010 -0.011** -0.004 -0.003 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployed -0.035*** -0.062*** -0.020*** -0.027*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Out of workforce -0.024*** -0.047*** -0.013* -0.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of contribution 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has a mortgage 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
II income quartile 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.006 0.009** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
III income quartile 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.008 0.010** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
IV income quartile 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
II wealth quartile 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
III wealth quartile 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
IV wealth quartile 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant -0.137***  -0.026  
(0.02)  (0.12)  
Individual Effects NO NO YES YES 
Macroarea YES YES OMITTED YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
# obs 52,076 52,076 52,076 52,076 
# indiv 18,278 18,278 18,278 18,278 
R2/pseudo R2 0.088 0.180 0.043 
F/ Wald χ2/ p-val 79.38 / 0.000 2604.96 / 0.000 19.42 / 0.000 2041.01 / 0.000 
F test αi=0 / p-val - - 1.88 / 0.000 114.67 / 0.000 
ρ - - 0.580 0.482 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
(a)Coefficients reported refer to average marginal effects 
Figure 2: Probability of participating in a supplementary pension scheme at 
representative value of the index HW 
 
Source: own elaborations from SHIW 1995-2012 
 
 
4.2 Restricting the estimation sample to working people 
Because not working individuals are, usually, less likely to participate in a complementary 
pension plan, we carry out some robustness checks to ensure that our results are not driven by 
the presence of unemployed/not employed in our estimation sample, as already mentioned in 
section 3. We thus exclude all individuals who were never employed/self-employed during 
our sample period (14,646 observations for 5,602 individuals), since those who worked for at 
least some years might have chosen to participate in a pension scheme while employed.   
The results of our robustness check are reported in table 6: column 1 and 3 report the same 
LPM-FE estimates of table 4 and 5 (third column) on the whole sample, while column 2 and 
4 report the estimates on the restricted sample. We confirm the negative and highly 
significant impact of homeownership in both specifications; furthermore, by excluding all 
individuals who never worked during our sample period, the negative impact of 
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Table 6: Participation in pension funds including / excluding who never worked 
 All 
Excluding who 
never worked All  
Excluding who 
never worked 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Homeowner -0.035*** -0.050***   
(0.01) (0.01)   
HW   -0.041*** -0.056*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared / 100 -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-employed -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployed -0.020*** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.018** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Out of workforce -0.013* -0.011 -0.013* -0.011 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of contributions 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has a mortgage 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.032 -0.150 -0.026 -0.142 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Individual Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
# obs 52,218 37,572 52,076 37,471 
# indiv 18,294 12,692 18,278 12,681 
Overall pseudo R2 0.043 0.036 0.043 0.036 
F/ p-val 19.02 / 0.000 18.12 / 0.000 19.42 / 0.000 18.51 / 0.000 
F test αi=0 / p-val 1.88 / 0.000 1.95 / 0.000 1.88 / 0.000 1.95 / 0.000 
ρ 0.580 0.538 0.580 0.543 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
All specifications are estimated by LPM-FE and include the following control variables: household size, dummies for 
marital status, dummies for educational attainment, dummy for head of household, income and wealth quartiles. Macroarea 
and female dummies are omitted because of no variation. 
 
4.3 Focusing on the effect of the 2007 reform 
Participation rates doubled since the 2007 reform, therefore it is worth checking whether the 
impact of homeownership remained unchanged by splitting our sample and re-estimating 
regression [2] for the periods 1995-2004 and 2006-2012. We start from 2006 rather than 2008 
because of the vast informational campaign which took place during 2006/2007 and is likely 
to have had an effect during that time.  
Homeownership has a negative and statistically significant sign in both periods, as shown 
in table 7. However, the less refined dichotomous indicator has lower explanatory power after 
the reform, while the continuous indicator, HW, remains highly statistically significant and, 
moreover, increases in size. We are therefore prone to conclude that, even after the 2007 
reform and the corresponding informational campaign, homeownership is negatively 
associated with participation in personal retirement plans or supplementary pension funds.  
Table 7: Participation in pension funds before and after the 2007 reform  
 1995-2004 2006-2012 1995-2004 2006-2012 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Homeowner -0.030*** -0.028**  
(0.01) (0.01)  
HW  -0.028*** -0.040*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared / 100 -0.007** -0.006 -0.007* -0.007 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-employed 0.021* -0.027* 0.020* -0.030* 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Unemployed -0.005 -0.031*** -0.005 -0.031** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Out of workforce 0.002 -0.022* 0.004 -0.024** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Years of contributions 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has a mortgage 0.011* 0.029*** 0.010* 0.032*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.231*** -0.144 -0.225*** -0.158 
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) 
Individual Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
# obs 31,380 25,357 31,241 23,275 
# indiv 12,944 10,121 12,933 9,981 
Overall pseudo R2 0.019 0.051 0.052 0.052 
F/ p-val 9.04 / 0.000 15.41 / 0.000 9.04 / 0.000 15.65 / 0.000 
F test αi=0 / p-val 1.69 / 0.000 1.67 / 0.000 1.90 / 0.000 1.86 / 0.000 
ρ 0.470 0.468 0.619 0.620 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
All specifications are estimated by LPM-FE and include the following control variables: household size, dummies for 
marital status, dummies for educational attainment, dummy for head of household, income and wealth quartiles. Macroarea 
and female dummies are omitted because of no variation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to explore determinants of the participation in supplementary 
pension schemes and to provide an alternative explanation for the low take up rate of pension 
funds in Italy. Specifically, we investigate the possibility of a trade-off between housing 
investment and the participation in supplementary pension schemes.  
Our results show that, after controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic variables 
and allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity, investment in housing appears to 
crowd out investment in personal retirement plans or supplementary pension funds. We show 
that, despite the positive relationship in the descriptive statistics, being a homeowner has a 
negative and highly significant impact on the probability of participating in a supplementary 
pension scheme. The effect is larger when we take into account unobserved individual 
heterogeneity suggesting that a simple regression on a pooled sample may underestimate the 
relationship of interest. Moreover, the trade-off appears to be stronger for the subsample of 
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Yit (Participation)  Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual participates in a pension fund, 0 
otherwise 
Homeowner Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in a household which owns its 
home, 0 otherwise 
HW Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1 and is equal to the value of the first home 
over total (gross) wealth. The variable is lagged by one period 
Female Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a female, 0 if male 
Age / Age 2 Integer values representing the age of the individual (values between 15 and 65) 
and its squared term. 
Marital status Discrete variable equal to: 
1 if the individual is married (baseline) 
2 if the individual is single  
3 if the individual is divorced  
4 if the individual is widow(er)  
Low education Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has no or elementary education, 0 
otherwise 
Medium Education Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has secondary education, 0 otherwise 
High Education Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a degree (3 years or more at 
university), 0 otherwise 
Household Size Discrete variable ranging from 1 to 12 representing the number of household 
components 
Head of Household Binary variable equal to one if the individuals is responsible for the financial 
decision making, 0 otherwise 
Job Status Discrete variable equal to: 
1 if the individual is an employee (baseline) 
2 if the individual is self employed  
3 if the individual is unemployed  
4 if the individual is out of the workforce  
Years of Contribution Integer values representing the number of years of contribution in a pension fund 
(self assessed) 
Has a mortgage Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a homeowner with a mortgage,  0 
otherwise 
Area Discrete variable equal to: 
1 If individual resident in the North of Italy (baseline) 
2 If individual resident in the Centre of Italy 
3 If individual resident in the South of Italy 
Income quartiles Discrete variable equal to: 
1 if household income within the first quartile (baseline) 
2 if household income within the second quartile 
3 if household income within the third quartile  
4 if household income above the third quartile 
Wealth quartiles Discrete variable equal to: 
1 if household wealth within the first quartile (baseline) 
2 if household wealth within the second quartile 
3 if household wealth within the third quartile  
4 if household wealth above the third quartile 
 
  
Summary statistics of the estimation sample (obs: 52,737) 
Mean SD MIN MAX 
Participation 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Homeowner 0.72 0.45 0 1 
HW 0.54 0.39 0 1 
Age 40.53 11.48 20 60 
Female 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Couple 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Single 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Divorced 0.04 0.12 0 1 
Widow(er) 0.02 0.19 0 1 
Low Education 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Medium Education 0.44 0.50 0 1 
High Education 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Household size 3.53 1.17 1 12 
Head of household 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Employee 0.51 0.49 0 1 
Self-employed 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Unemployed 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Out of workforce 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Years of contribution 12.56 11.97 0 50 
HH has a mortgage 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Resident in the North 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Resident in the Centre 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Resident in the South  0.41 0.49 0 1 
I income quartile 0.19 0.39 0 1 
II income quartile 0.23 0.42 0 1 
III income quartile 0.27 0.45 0 1 
IV income quartile 0.31 0.46 0 1 
I wealth quartile 0.24 0.42 0 1 
II wealth quartile 0.24 0.42 0 1 
III wealth quartile 0.26 0.44 0 1 
IV wealth quartile 0.27 0.44 0 1 
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